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Castle“. The official anniversary celebration 
in June featured speeches by members of the 
foundation board and a concert.
We are very pleased about the positive feed-
back we have received from various sides 
during the anniversary year. This feedback 
suggests that, during the last two-and-a-half 
decades, „Gerzensee“ has firmly established 
itself as a Center of excellence whose cen-
tral bankers’ courses, doctoral program, and 
academic conferences are held in very high 
esteem. Many of this Newsletter’s readers 
have contributed to this success, and I wish 
to warmly thank them all for their apprecia-
ted support.
This Newsletter looks back at the events du-
ring the anniversary year, offers a preview of 
the academic activities planned for the year 
2012, and also features an interview with 
Professor Jeremy Stein who taught one of the 
advanced doctoral courses in the summer.
I hope that you will find the Newsletter in-
formative and look forward to welcoming 
many of you in Gerzensee during the coming 
months.
With best wishes for a happy new year,
Dirk Niepelt
Director
May 2011 marked the 25th anniversary of 
the first central bankers’ course held at the 
Study Center Gerzensee. On the occasion 
of this anniversary, the Center extended its 
conference program. Highlights included the 
European Summer Symposium in Internatio-
nal Macroeconomics (ESSIM, hosted for the 
first time by the Center), the European Sum-
mer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET, 
holding its 20th meeting in Gerzensee), and 
the Conference with the Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking (with papers contributed 
by academics who have been teaching doc-
toral and central bankers‘ courses over many 
years). The Center also published a booklet 
about the long history of its home, the „New 
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FINANCIALCRISESAND
FINANCIALSTABILITY
Professor Stein, many economists have diffi-
culties to understand the causes of the dif-
ferent recent crises: the subprime mortgage 
crisis, the global financial crisis, and now the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Can behavioral 
economics and behavioral finance help them 
to understand the emergence of these crises?
Absolutely, behavioral finance can be helpful. 
There are two ways: At a broad level, a dog-
matic belief in market efficiency led people 
to not ask certain questions at various stages 
before and during these crises. If your base-
line view is that markets are efficient, and you 
observe that some financial innovations, e.g., 
Collateralized Debt Obligations, grow very 
quickly, then you conclude that these financi-
al innovations must be completing markets. If 
behavioral economics and behavioral finance 
do nothing else than make you a little bit 
skeptical, then it is already helpful. The most 
reasonable way to think about unusual obser-
vations, such as the fast growth of Collatera-
lized Debt Obligations, is to have a more open 
prior. The fact that regulators did not suffici-
ently question such developments in the years 
leading up to the crisis might be ultimately 
rooted in an implicit assumption that markets 
are efficient.
At a more specific level, behavioral economics 
and behavioral finance are helpful for under-
standing the demand for particular types of 
assets. For example, where did the demand for 
very safe assets come from, and what are the 
consequences when these assets turn out to 
be not so safe? Why do we observe such a pa-
nic when one money market breaks the buck 
and goes to 97 cents? You could tell a traditi-
onal economic story with bank runs and stra-
tegic complementarities. But there are other 
important pieces to the story: People believed 
that something would never go down. Once 
this belief turned out to be incorrect, it caused 
a radical change in their views, and a radical 
change in their willingness to tolerate risks. 
Behavioral economics is easier to apply to un-
derstand what happened, but potentially har-
der to apply to thinking about how regulation 
should be designed. If investors have hetero-
geneous or biased beliefs, can one assume 
that the regulator has the right beliefs? In my 
most recent work I have erred on the side of 
being quite neoclassical, because I have been 
trying to do economics that can ultimately be 
used normatively to think about regulation. 
That is why I want to at least start with models 
in which actors are reasonably rational. 
In some of your most recent research you stu-
dy the role that monetary policy should play in 
fostering financial stability. Could you explain 
your main findings, and what they imply for 
the conduct of monetary policy?
The old fashioned way of thinking about mo-
netary policy is that the central banks’ job is to 
regulate the supply of money. There was not 
a huge distinction made between the money 
provided by the government and between pri-
vately created money like bank deposits. The 
consensus was that too much money was a 
bad thing because it leads to inflation. A ne-
wer strand of the macroeconomic literature 
focuses not so much on quantities, but on the 
so-called Taylor rule, according to which the 
central banks’ job is to control an interest rate. 
In 2006 the Federal Reserve even stopped tra-
cking M3 - a broad measure of money - be-
cause it was not seen as particularly useful for 
forecasting economic activity or inflation.
In my recent research I argue that central banks 
should go back to worrying about the quantity 
of money. I argue that there is a role for consi-
dering broad measures of money, not because 
they are useful to forecast inflation, but be-
cause the quantity of broad money provides 
information about private money creation. It 
is telling you something about the amount of 
maturity transformation that is happening in 
the economy, and, therefore, about the poten-
tial risk of financial fragility. Once we better 
understand this link, we may want to use it 
as an input into macro-prudential regulation, 
rather than for controlling inflation.
You have recently also worked on macro-
prudential regulation more generally. From a 
theoretical point of view, what are the pro-
blems of a regulatory framework that is pri-
marily “micro-prudential” in nature, and how 
can macro-prudential regulation address these 
problems?
The essence of a micro-prudential regulatory 
framework is making sure that individual in-
stitutions are sufficiently well capitalized, such 
that the tax payer is not going to lose money. 
Therefore, as a micro-prudential regulator, you 
want banks to have a certain capital ratio. If a 
bank loses money it has to restore its capital 
ratio. There are two ways a bank can improve 
its capital ratio: it can raise new capital, or it 
can shrink its assets. As a micro-prudential re-
gulator, all you care about is that this one bank 
does not impose losses on the tax payer, but 
you are indifferent whether the bank gets its 
capital ratio up through the numerator or the 
denominator.
The micro-prudential regulatory framework is 
fine if one bank gets into troubles in isolation, 
but if many banks are getting into troubles si-
multaneously, the method of adjustment be-
comes important. We do not want all banks 
to adjust their capital ratios by shrinking their 
assets simultaneously. That would lead to a 
credit crunch and fire sales. The essence of 
a macro-prudential regulatory framework is 
to avoid forms of regulation that lead to wi-
despread deleveraging, shrinkage of bank as-
sets, and shrinkage of credit creation.
Many of the macro-prudential regulatory 
tools, like time-varying capital or contingent 
capital, can be thought of as ways of having 
more of the adjustment come without shrin-
kage in assets. Another example would be the 
quality of capital. There is a lot of talk that the-
re should be less preferred stock in Tier 1 ca-
pital. From a micro-prudential perspective that 
does not make sense. Preferred stock seems 
fine as long as it will lose money before the 
deposit insurer. But to have a bank recapitalize 
and raise new equity is easier with a capital 
structure that does not have a lot of prefer-
red stock standing before new equity holders. 
I think this is now well understood. There are 
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issues where it is less clear that the regulatory 
tools will exist to do what is desirable from a 
macro-prudential perspective. For example, if 
we had to do 2007 over again, a macro-pru-
dential policy would be to move quite aggres-
sively to cut bank dividends at a relatively early 
stage. It however remains an open question 
whether we would succeed with such macro-
prudential policies.
Every new piece of regulation can have nega-
tive and potentially unforeseen consequences. 
What do you expect to be the main costs and 
distortions from the current macro-prudential 
regulation? 
We are heading in a quite positive direction 
with respect to banking regulation narrowly, 
as Basel III has substantially raised capital. The-
re are a lot of complications involved with this 
measure, but I think raising capital is valuable 
and important. The flipside is that we have paid 
far less attention than we should have to the 
so-called shadow banking system, which are 
a lot of bank like activities which happen off 
the balance sheets of banks through securiti-
zation, tranching, and eventually money mar-
ket funds holding commercial paper that has 
been issued against these securities. It seems 
likely that if we regulate the conventional ban-
king sector very heavily without regulating the 
shadow banking sector in a harmonized way, 
then we are going to get more activity moving 
into the shadow banking sector. Therefore, my 
single biggest worry is that the next crisis will 
be less a crisis of the banks and more a crisis 
that originates in the shadow banking sector.  
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, which was signed into 
law last year, was said to represent a signifi-
cant change in the American financial regu-
latory environment. What do you think are 
the main strengths and weaknesses of Dodd-
Frank? 
The main strength of Dodd-Frank and also 
Basel III is the focus on capital. The moving 
of derivatives to centralized clearing can be 
significantly positive as well. There are some 
caveats however. One might have a prolife-
ration of different clearing houses that are in 
competition with one another, but if handled 
well, that can be a significant positive.
A main danger follows from the fact that 
Dodd-Frank deliberately reduces the discreti-
on of the Federal Reserve in order to reduce 
moral hazard. This makes it harder for the Fe-
deral Reserve to act as a lender of last resort, 
and, in particular, to intervene in certain ways 
to support shadow banking kind of entities in 
the way it stepped up in support of the mo-
ney market sector. I have already discussed 
how the current capital regulations may shift 
activities into the shadow banking system. So, 
the aspect of Dodd-Frank I would most worry 
about is that it makes interventions to support 
the shadow banking sector harder for the Fe-
deral Reserve at exactly the time in which re-
gulation may be driving more activity into that 
sector.  
When dealing with the European sovereign 
debt crisis, policy makers seem very worried 
about default contagion. Are these worries 
justified? And what are the likely channels 
through which defaults can be contagious?
It is often said that contagion is one of these 
things that is invoked much more often than 
explained well. It is very standard for people 
to say that if Greece goes down, Portugal or 
maybe Spain will be next. But it is not immedi-
ately obvious how contagion works. You could 
easily tell a story that goes the other way: If 
policy makers decided not to do anything for 
Greece, then they could save their resources 
and use them to support others. In this case 
there would be a kind of anti-contagion. 
One mechanism for contagion comes from 
learning about the intentions of policy ma-
kers. We saw this mechanism very clearly with 
Lehman Brothers. The government stepped in 
to save Bear Stearns, but afterwards it did not 
step in to save Lehman Brothers. The next day 
we observed enormous spikes in credit def-
ault spreads on Morgan Stanley, for example. 
Thus there was clearly contagion from Leh-
man Brothers to Morgan Stanley. The reason is 
quite intuitive: after Bear Stearns, market par-
ticipants believed that there would be govern-
ment support for large broker dealer firms, 
and then when Lehman Brothers went down, 
it turned out that this support was not there.  
I think that there is a similar dynamic now in 
play in Europe. For example, a lot of resour-
ces have been devoted to avoiding default in 
Greece. Policy makers have put a lot of their 
credibility chips on their table. If they now 
withdraw support from Greece, then it is in-
deed likely that there will be some impact on 
other markets, because this would send a si-
gnal about their willingness to support other 
countries. But it does not immediately follow 
that the right policy from day one was one of 
unconditional support for Greece on the pre-
mise of “avoiding contagion”.  One needs to 
think carefully about the dynamics that lead 
policy makers to get into this sort of box in 
the first place.
Professor Stein, thank you very much for this 
interview.
Roland Hodler conducted this interview.
Professor Jeremy C. Stein is the Moise Y. Safra Professor of Economics at Harvard University, 
where he teaches courses in finance in the undergraduate and PhD programs. Before coming 
to Harvard in 2000, he was on the finance faculty of M.I.T.’s Sloan School of Management for 
ten years, most recently as the J.C. Penney Professor of Management. Prior to that, he was 
an assistant professor of finance at the Harvard Business School from 1987-1990. He recei-
ved his AB in economics summa cum laude from Princeton University in 1983 and his PhD in 
economics from M.I.T. in 1986. Stein’s research has covered such topics as: behavioral finance 
and stock-market efficiency; corporate investment and financing decisions; risk management; 
capital allocation inside firms; banking; financial regulation; and monetary policy. He was a 
co-editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, and has served on the editorial boards of 
several other economics and finance journals. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a mem-
ber of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Financial Advisory Roundtable. In 2008, he was 
president of the American Finance Association. He served in the Obama Administration, as a 
senior advisor to the Treasury Secretary and on the staff of the National Economic Council in 
February-July 2009.
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ACADEMIC CONFERENCES
EUROPEANSUMMERSYMPOSIUMININTERNATIONALMACROECONOMICS
May 31 – June 3, 2011, jointly with CEPR
Selected Sessions:
Fiscal Policy
Female Empowerment / Intellectual Competition
Business Cycle Theory
Monetary Policy
Energy and Climate
Prices and Investment
Unemployment
Program available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/
NCCRFINRISKRESEARCHDAYANDDOCTORALWORKSHOP
June 6 - 7, 2011, jointly with Swiss Finance Institute
Selected Sessions:
Risk Management
Banking and Regulation
Asset Pricing and Portfolio Management
Corporate Finance
Quantitative Methods in Finance
Program available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/
EUROPEANSUMMERSYMPOSIUMINECONOMICTHEORY
July 4 – 15, 2011, jointly with CEPR
Focus Sessions:
Leverage Stacks and the Financial System
Contagious Adverse Selection
Risk Sharing or Risk Taking? Counterparty Risk, Margins and Incentives
Financially-Constrained Arbitrage and Cross-Market Contagion
Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty
Liquidity Hoarding
Market Inefficiency with Rational Agents
Cream-Skimming in Financial Markets
Money, Financial Stability, and Efficiency
Asset Commonality, Debt Maturity, and Systemic Risk
Risking Other People’s Money: Gambling, Limited Liability, and Optimal Incentives
Regulatory Reforms (?) after the Crisis
Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent
Macroprudential Regulation and Credit Cycles
Short-Term Collateralized Debt Markets
Program available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/ 
EUROPEANSUMMERSYMPOSIUMINFINANCIALMARKETS
July 18 – 29, 2011, jointly with CEPR
Focus Sessions:
Labor and Finance
Family Firms
Equilibrium Asset Pricing with an Emphasis on Computation
Rare Events
Program available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/ 
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CONFERENCEWITHTHEJOURNALOFMONEY,CREDITANDBANKING
October 21 - 22, 2011, jointly with the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, the Swiss 
National Bank, and the University of Bern
The Federal Reserve and the Emerging Markets: A High Frequency Empirical Investigation 
Author: Sebastian Edwards, UCLA
Discussant: Frank Schorfheide, University of Pennsylvania
Slow Recoveries: A Structural Interpretation
Authors: Jordi Galí, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Frank Smets, European Central Bank, and 
Raphael Wouters, National Bank of Belgium
Discussant: Andrew Levin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Asymmetries in Price-Setting Behavior: New Microeconometric Evidence from Switzerland
Authors: Bo Honoré, Princeton University, Daniel Kaufmann and Sarah Lein, Swiss National 
Bank 
Discussant: Raphael Wouters, National Bank of Belgium
Inflation and Unit Labor Cost
Authors: Robert G. King, Boston University, and Mark Watson, Princeton University
Withering Government Spending Multipliers
Authors: Harris Dellas and Fabrice Collard, University of Bern, Matthew Canzoneri and  
Behzad Diba, Georgetown University
Discussant: Morten Ravn, University College London
Business Cycles and Labor Market Flows with Skill Heterogeneity in a Monetary Policy Model
Authors: Carl Walsh, University of California, and Federico Ravenna, HEC Montreal
Discussant: Wouter Den Haan, Amsterdam School of Economics
Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macro Prudential Regulation
Authors: Jean-Charles Rochet, Swiss Banking Institute, and Hans Gersbach, ETH Zurich
Discussant: John Moore, London School of Economics
Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Regulation
Authors: Mathias Dewatripont, National Bank of Belgium and Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
and Jean Tirole, Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse
Discussant: Hans Gersbach, ETH Zurich
Program available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/ 
OTHEREVENT
Graduation Ceremony for the participants of the Swiss Program for Beginning Doctoral Stu-
dents in Economics 2010 on May 27, 2011.
Picture gallery at www.szgerzensee.ch/index.php?id=484
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COURSES
CENTRALBANKERSCOURSES2011
Advanced Topics in Empirical Finance, jointly with the Swiss National Bank
External lecturers: Casper de Vries, Thierry Foucault, Michael Rockinger
Monetary Policy, Exchange Rates and Capital Flows
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Stefan Gerlach, Philipp Harms
Banking Regulation and Supervision
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Xavier Freixas, Anthony Saunders
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Behzad Diba
Advanced Topics in Monetary Economics
External lecturers: Lawrence Christiano, Carl Walsh
Instruments of Financial Markets, jointly with Swiss Finance Institute 
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Amit Goyal, Michel Habib, Erwan Morellec,  
Michael Rockinger
Information available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/central-bankers/ 
SWISSPROGRAMFORBEGINNINGDOCTORALSTUDENTSINECONOMICS2011
Microeconomics
Lecturers: Piero Gottardi, John Moore, Klaus Schmidt, Jörgen Weibull
Macroeconomics
Lecturers: Jordi Galí, Robert King, Sérgio Rebelo 
Econometrics
Lecturers: Bo Honoré, Mark Watson
Information available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/ 
ADVANCEDCOURSESINECONOMICSFORDOCTORALSTUDENTS
ANDFACULTYMEMBERS2011
Panel Data Econometrics 
Lecturer: Manuel Arellano
Financial Crisis and Financial Stability 
Lecturer: Jeremy Stein 
Monetary Economics and Imperfect Information
Lecturer: Ricardo Reis
Recent Advances in International Trade 
Lecturer: Pol Antràs
Information available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/
  
LAWANDECONOMICSCOURSESFORDOCTORALSTUDENTS
ANDFACULTYMEMBERS2011
Law and Economics of Torts and Medical Malpractice 
Lecturer: Jennifer Arlen
Corporate Law and Economics 
Lecturer: Robert Daines
Information available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/
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AGENDA
CONFERENCES2012
Research Day and Swiss Doctoral Workshop in Finance, jointly with Swiss Finance Institute
European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, ESSET, jointly with CEPR
European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets, ESSFM, jointly with CEPR
Conference with the Journal of Monetary Economics, jointly with the Swiss National Bank
Conference „Swiss Debt Brake – 10 years on“, jointly with the Federal Finance Administration and the University of Lucerne
Information soon available at www.szgerzensee.ch/research/conferences/ 
CENTRALBANKERSCOURSES2012
Advanced Topics in Macroeconometrics
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, David DeJong, Juan José Dolado
Monetary Policy, Exchange Rates and Capital Flows
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Giancarlo Corsetti, Philipp Harms
Inflation Forecasting and Monetary Policy, jointly with Swiss National Bank
External lecturers: Pierpaolo Benigno, SNB-Staff
Financial Stability, jointly with the Swiss National Bank
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Martín Gonzalez-Eiras, Michael Rockinger, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, SNB-Staff
Monetary Policy in Developing Countries
External lecturers: Sebastian Edwards, Philipp Harms
Advanced Topics in Monetary Economics
External lecturers: Lawrence Christiano, Carl Walsh 
Instruments of Financial Markets, jointly with Swiss Finance Institute
External lecturers: Philippe Bacchetta, Amit Goyal, Michel Habib, Erwan Morellec, Michael Rockinger
Information soon available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/central-bankers/ 
SWISSPROGRAMFORBEGINNINGDOCTORALSTUDENTSINECONOMICS2012
Microeconomics
Lecturers: Piero Gottardi, John Moore, Klaus Schmidt, Jörgen Weibull
Macroeconomics
Lecturers: Jordi Galí, Robert King, Sérgio Rebelo 
Econometrics
Lecturers: Bo Honoré, Mark Watson
Information soon available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/ 
ADVANCEDCOURSESINECONOMICSFORDOCTORALSTUDENTSANDFACULTYMEMBERS2012
Liquidity Regulation
Lecturer: Douglas Gale
Bayesian Econometrics and its Applications
Lecturer: John Geweke
The Political Economics of Development Clusters
Lecturer: Torsten Persson
Fourth Course: tba
Information soon available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/
  
LAWANDECONOMICSCOURSESFORDOCTORALSTUDENTSANDFACULTYMEMBERS2012
Antitrust Law and Economics 
Lecturer: Daniel Rubinfeld
Banking: Law and Economics Issues after the Financial Crisis
Lecturer: Geoffrey Miller
Information soon available at www.szgerzensee.ch/courses/doctoral/
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Ernst Baltensperger stepped down as a formal 
advisor. However, he will maintain close links to 
the Study Center.
Roland Hodler accepted a full time professorship 
at the University of Lucerne. He will continue to 
cooperate with the Study Center.
Cyril Monnet joined the institute from the Fe-
deral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. He suc-
ceeded Roland Hodler as Program Manager 
Doctoral Courses. He is also a professor at the 
University of Bern.
Corinne Conti Ambühl, administrative manager 
for the academic conferences, celebrated her 25 
year-jubilee.
Susanne Senn, administrative manager for the 
doctoral programs, increased her load to 40%.
Dennis Reinhardt graduated and left the Study 
Center to take up a position at the Bank of Eng-
land.
Yves Ortiz graduated and left the Study Center 
to work in the private sector.
Luzia Halter, University of Bern, was hired as an 
assistant. 
Nicole Aregger and Oliver Baltisberger started 
as assistants at the beginning of 2012 with the 
objective of writing a doctoral thesis.
STAFF NEWS
Chairman
Prof. Dr. Thomas Jordan
Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the 
Swiss National Bank 
Members
Prof. Dr. Stefan Bechtold
ETH Zurich  
Corina Casanova 
Federal Chancellor  
Prof. Dr. Harris Dellas
University of Bern  
Dr. Werner Hermann 
Director of the Swiss National Bank, Inter-
national Monetary Cooperation (January 2012)
Stefan Lehmann
President of the Community of Gerzensee  
Prof. Dr. Yvan Lengwiler
University of Basel  
Dr. Carlos Lenz 
Head of Inflation Forecasting of the 
Swiss National Bank (January 2012)
Dr. Michel Peytrignet
Director of the Swiss National Bank 
Head of Economic Affairs (December 2011)
Dr. Thomas Wiedmer
CFO and alternate Member of the Governing 
Board of the Swiss National Bank
FOUNDATION COUNCIL
Martín Gonzalez-Eiras, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires, visited the Study Center at the end 
of May to collaborate with Dirk Niepelt.
Christos Kotsogiannis, University of Exeter, visited for one week in December, working on a project 
with Nils Herger on foreign direct investment and taxation.
VISITORS‘ PROGRAM
11.01
Roland Hodler 
„Development (Paradigm) Failures“
11.02
Raphael Auer, Kathrin Degen, and Andreas M. 
Fischer 
„Low-Wage Import Competition, Inflationary 
Pressure, and Industry Dynamics in Europe“ 
11.03
Raphael Auer and Philip Sauré 
„CHF Strength and Swiss Export Performance 
– Evidence and Outlook from a Disaggregate 
Analysis“ 
11.04
Raphael Auer and Philip Sauré 
„Spatial Competition in Quality, Demand-Indu-
ced Innovation, and Schumpeterian Growth“ 
11.05
Emanuel Kohlscheen 
„The Journal Rankings of Central Banks“ 
11.06
Martín Gonzalez-Eiras and Dirk Niepelt 
„Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, 
and Growth“ 
11.07
Salvatore Dell’Erba and Dennis Reinhardt 
„Surfing the Capital Waves: A Sector-Level 
Examination of Surges in FDI Inflows“
11.08
Yves Ortiz and Martin Schüle 
„Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction:  
A Probabilistic Multi-Agent Model“ 
11.09
Yves Ortiz 
„Prices and Choices in the Swiss Health Care 
Insurance Market“
11.10
Philipp Harms and Pierre-Guillaume Méon
„An FDI is an FDI is an FDI? The Growth Effects 
of Greenfield Investment and Mergers and 
Acquisitions in Developing Countries“
11.11
Toni Beutler and Mathieu Grobéty
„The Collateral Channel under Imperfect Debt 
Enforcement“
WORKING PAPERS
Das “Neue Schloss” Gerzensee – Vom Herr-
schaftssitz zum Studienzentrum (Anniversary 
booklet)
PUBLICATION
High ranking representatives from politics, the Swiss National Bank and Swiss Universities as well 
as alumni and inhabitants from the community of Gerzensee attended the official anniversary cele-
bration in June. The festivity included speeches by Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing 
Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Foundation Council of the Study Center, as 
well as Stefan Lehman, President of the community of Gerzensee, and a concert with the casal-
Quartett.
Picture gallery at www.szgerzensee.ch/about/cultural-events/25th-anniversary-of-the-study-center-
gerzensee/ 
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ABOUT
Dennis Reinhardt
“Three Essays on International Capital Flows, 
Productivity, and Capital Mobility”
ISBN 978-3-9523361-3-7
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